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The present study investigated whether the frequency of probe-caught mind wandering
varied by condition and had any impact on performance in both an item-by-item reading
aloud task and a blocked version of the classic Stroop task. Across both experiments, mind
wandering rates were found to be quite high and were negatively associated with vocal
onset latencies and error rates across conditions. Despite this however, we observed poor
correspondence between the effects of task demands on mind wandering rates and the
effects of mind wandering on primary task performance. We discuss these findings in
relation to attentional resource accounts of mind wandering and suggest that individuals
can adjust the relative distribution of executive/attentional resources between internal and
external goals in a way that maximizes off-task thought while preserving primary task
performance.
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The experience of having one’s mind unintentionally wander
away from the task at hand is ubiquitous and has been the
focus of considerable empirical study. Indeed, mind wandering
is remarkably prevalent, ranging from around 20% of the time
in laboratory reading tasks to around 50% of the time in simple
attention tasks (Smallwood et al., 2004) and every day activities
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). In addition, there is a grow-
ing body of evidence suggesting that mind wandering can have
significant behavioral costs for primary task performance. The
present work examines the prevalence and consequences of mind
wandering in two well-studied laboratory tasks: reading aloud
single words and non-words, and color naming in the context
of congruent and incongruent color words (Stroop, 1935). These
tasks have been heavily utilized by researchers for decades, and
have been used to measure and make inferences about funda-
mental cognitive processes related to single word reading (as well
as other processes such as attention, perception, and memory).
However, these tasks have not been considered in the context
of mind wandering. We make use of mind wandering in this
context in order to inform our understanding of the relation
between mind wandering and attention, while at the same time
exploring the prevalence and consequences of mind wandering
on two as yet unexamined behaviors (i.e., reading aloud and color
naming).
Although color naming in the context of a block of incon-
gruent Stroop trials invariably places high demands on attention,
specifically selective attention (Bench et al., 1993; Vendrell et al.,
1995; see also MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000), the role of
attention in word reading is less clear. We therefore begin by con-
sidering mind wandering and reading with respect to the concept
of attention. The theoretical alternatives relating mind wander-
ing, reading aloud, and attention are shown at the top of Table 1.
As can be seen in the table, we consider the possibilities that read-
ing aloud and mind wandering each may or may not require
attention and the possibility that if both reading and mind wan-
dering do require attention, the type of attention they require
might be the same or different. The bottom of Table 1 shows how
the various theoretical combinations would manifest in behav-
ioral outcomes in single word reading and Stroop (in which the
task is to actively avoidword reading). Specifically, the table shows
how the different theoretical accounts would predict (1) the pres-
ence or absence of differences in frequencies of mind wandering
across different reading conditions that require different amounts
of attention (e.g., while reading words vs. non-words or while
color naming on congruent vs. incongruent trials) and (2) the
extent to which bouts of mind wandering would influence per-
formance (reaction time and accuracy) in reading aloud and the
Stroop task. The central point to take away here, is that regardless
of the theoretical relationships between reading/naming aloud,
attention, and mind wandering—variations in mind wandering
rates across conditions and mind wandering-related performance
costs should either both be present or both be absent. Assessing
these alternatives is the purpose of the present work.
In what follows we review various theoretical positions out-
lined in Table 1. First we consider existing views on the relation
between mind wandering and attention. We then briefly review
the current controversy regarding the involvement of attention
in reading aloud. Finally, we discuss the possibility that mind
wandering and reading aloud might require the same attentional
resources.
MIND WANDERING AND ATTENTION
Smallwood and Schooler (2006) propose an account of mind
wandering in which controlled processing directs attention away
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Table 1 | A representation of the theoretical relations between
attention, reading and mind wandering, and the empirical predictions
that follow from these alternatives with regards to whether
differences in mind wandering across condition should be observed
and whether mind wandering-related performance deficits should be
observed.
1 2 3 4 5
THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES
Mind wandering requires attention Yes Yes Yes No No
Reading requires attention Yes Yes No Yes No
Reading and mind wandering
require the same type of attention
Yes No – – –
EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
Differences in mind wandering
across conditions within task
Yes No No No No
Mind wandering-related
performance deficits
Yes No No No No
from external stimuli and goals toward internal, personally rele-
vant, thoughts and goals. This account suggests that the amount
of mind wandering that occurs in a given task context is directly
related to the executive and attentional demands of the primary
task, since the act of mind wandering itself requires that at least
some executive resources be available to direct the focus of atten-
tion internally. Specifically, it is argued that the more controlled
processing that is required by a primary task, the lower the inci-
dence of mind wandering will be (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006; Smallwood, 2010). It should be noted that this type of
relationship has also been posited to explain dual-task perfor-
mance, whereby mental resources must be divided among two
distinct tasks (Pashler, 1994) perhaps according to some principle
that maximizes performance on both tasks (Navon and Gopher,
1979). This distribution process is likely to hinder task perfor-
mance, particularly when one or more of the tasks places high
demands on executive resources (Moscovitch, 1994). Theoretical
accounts of resource distribution in mind wandering may there-
fore mirror those posited to explain dual-task interference in
prior work. Indeed, some evidence does exist for this contention.
For example, high perceptual load has been shown to decrease
reports of off-task thought relative to low perceptual load in a
visual search task (Forster and Lavie, 2009). In addition, more
demanding go/no-go tasks (with a low target probability) result
in lower mind wandering rates than easier (high target probabil-
ity) versions of the same task (Smallwood et al., 2007). Finally,
it has been shown that mind wandering rates are significantly
higher in the second half of a sustained attention-to-response
task (SART, see Robertson et al., 1997) relative to the first half,
presumably because the task demands decrease as experience
with the task increases (Smallwood et al., 2004). Therefore, in at
least some contexts, task demands predict the frequency of mind
wandering.
The relative frequencies of mind wandering across tasks (and
across conditions within tasks) aside, the most important issue
concerning research on mind wandering is the way in which
off-task thought hinders or disrupts primary task performance.
It has been shown for example that SART errors are related to
absentmindedness assessed via questionnaire (Manly et al., 1999)
and that faster responding in the SART task occurs in blocks
in which mind wandering is shown to occur (Smallwood et al.,
2004). In addition, individuals display increased response vari-
ability in the trials prior to off-task reports relative to on-task
reports in a continuous (metronome) response task (Seli et al.,
2013). It therefore seems as though there is a strong correspon-
dence between the executive processes required for mind wan-
dering and those required for sustained attention tasks requiring
overt manual responding.
It is therefore apparent that there is a wealth of empirical evi-
dence indicating that mind wandering does not typify a lack of
attention, but rather, a re-direction of attention away from the
external environment. Returning to Table 1, it seems as though
theoretical alternatives four and five can largely be ruled out.
Given that mind wandering is believed to require attention,
options one, two, and three remain as possible theoretical alterna-
tives regarding the relationship between mind wandering, reading
at the single word level, and attention. Mainly, whether or not
reading requires attention, and if so, whether it requires the same
type of attention that is involved in mind wandering.
READING AND ATTENTION
For skilled readers, the translation of print into speech seems
effortless, and is widely considered to be unavoidable, as in the
classic Stroop task [1935; see also MacLeod’s (1991) review].
Indeed, this phenomenology has been formalized in theoreti-
cal accounts in which phonological re-coding of print is widely
argued to reflect “automatic” processes that occur without the
need for any kind of “attention” (e.g., LaBerge and Samuels, 1974;
Posner and Snyder, 1975; Neely and Kahan, 2001; Brown et al.,
2002 among many others). For example, LaBerge and Samuels
(1974) argue that: “With enough practice, of course, activation of
the stimulus code excites the response code without attentional
assistance” (p. 316). And Brown et al. (2002) have contended
that: “[well-known words] can activate their lexical representa-
tions . . . without having visual attention focused on them” (p.
237). In contrast, other researchers have argued that several dif-
ferent kinds of attention play a prominent role when identifying
words in a variety of paradigms. For example, spatial attention
has been implicated in word reading in the context of the Stroop
paradigm (Besner and Stolz, 1999; Roberts and Besner, 2005), as
well as in the context of the spatial cueing paradigm (McCann
et al., 1992; Lachter et al., 2004; Waechter et al., 2011). Moreover,
it has been argued that more spatial attention is required for sub-
lexical than lexical processing (Waechter et al., 2012), and that
executive processes (intention) can play a role in the context of
the Task Set paradigm when reading both words and non-words
aloud (Besner and Care, 2003; O’Malley and Besner, 2012). Thus,
although many specific types of attention have been implicated
in word identification, perhaps the most relevant for the present
study is the role of central attention, as it is arguably synonymous
with the type of central executive resources implicated in mind
wandering.
Central attention has been implicated in the process of trans-
lating orthographic representations into speech (reading aloud).
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For example, it has been argued that more central attention is
required in the context of sublexical phonology than lexical pro-
cessing when reading aloud in the Psychological Refractory Period
(PRP) paradigm (Reynolds and Besner, 2006; O’Malley et al.,
2008). Therefore, although there remains considerable debate
in the literature regarding whether processes related to reading
require attention or whether such processes occur “automati-
cally,” those researchers who do suggest a prominent role of
attention suggest that the act of reading aloud depends on cen-
tral attention. Returning to Table 1, the first three alternatives
still seem to be plausible, however the evidence points to the
conclusion that at least some executive resources (or central atten-
tion) are required for reading aloud, suggesting that options one
and two are the most plausible. Given this, the incidence and
consequences of mind wandering on reading aloud would seem
to depend on whether mind wandering and reading require the
same type of attention.
DO MINDWANDERING AND READING SHARE THE SAME
TYPE OF ATTENTION?
It is often assumed that if two tasks rely on the same kind of atten-
tion (i.e., they make use of the same executive resources) then
performing both tasks simultaneously ought to cause interference
(deficits in task performance). Indeed, this idea has been borne
out in a host of empirical demonstrations. For example, it has
been shown that one’s ability to perform a visual search task is
hindered by the additional requirement to maintain a memory
load (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977), one’s ability to drive a car is
affected by use of a cellular phone (Strayer and Johnston, 2001),
and one’s ability to learn novel categories is disrupted by a work-
ing memory task (Zeithamova and Maddox, 2006). It therefore
stands to reason that if mind wandering and reading rely on the
same attentional resources, we should expect to see two things:
(1) as the amount of resources required by the primary read-
ing task increases, mind wandering rates should decrease, and (2)
devoting resources to mind wandering should result in deficits in
reading performance.
While no prior work has assessed the relationship between
mind wandering and reading aloud single words and non-words,
there has been considerable recent interest concerning mind wan-
dering and reading in general. For example, Feng et al. (2013)
found that participants mind wandered more while reading dif-
ficult compared to easy texts (in contrast to the findings from
sustained attention tasks) and that mind wandering had a greater
negative impact on the difficult relative to easy texts. In con-
trast, Unsworth and McMillan (2012) found that topic interest
and motivation better accounted for mind wandering differences
across texts that varied in difficulty. It is therefore an open ques-
tion as to whether mind wandering rates will vary as a function
of the demands placed on controlled processing in tasks that
involve reading and overt vocal responses in an item-by-item
paradigm. However, general performance deficits owing to mind
wandering while reading (silently) have been well documented.
For example research on mindless reading has revealed that mind
wandering impairs participants’ ability to understand a complex
narrative (Smallwood et al., 2008b). In addition, mindless read-
ing also appears to be associated with longer fixation durations
to individual words (Reichle et al., 2010) and an increase in
eye blink rates relative to normal reading (Smilek et al., 2010),
and the speeding of manual key-presses that advance text in a
word-by-word reading paradigm (Franklin et al., 2011).
There is therefore, a large body of evidence suggesting that
reading likely shares attentional resources with mind wander-
ing since these behaviors seem to interfere with one another.
Consequently, the available evidence seems to suggest that of our
theoretical alternatives outlined in Table 1, the first option is the
most probable. Given this, we would expect that mind wander-
ing rates should vary as a function of task demands when reading
aloud and color naming, and that mind wandering should affect
reading performance in some way.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
In the two experiments presented here, we evaluate reading per-
formance directly by having participants read aloud words and
non-words (Experiment 1) and indirectly by measuring color
naming in the Stroop task (Experiment 2). In both experiments
we varied possible attentional demands of the task by varying
either word familiarity (Experiment 1: low and high frequency
words and non-words) or word-color congruity (Experiment 2:
congruent vs. incongruent). In both experiments, we included
intermittent thought probes (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Smallwood et al., 2007) asking participants to report whether they
were on or off task at the moment just prior to the probe. In this
way it was possible to evaluate the behavioral outcomes shown
in Table 1; namely, (1) whether the frequency of mind wandering
varied as a function of the different demands placed on attention
in different conditions and (2) whether mind wandering had an
effect on performance (by comparing performance just prior to
on and off-task reports).
To foreshadow the results, we find that, in both of the exper-
iments reported here, mind wandering rates vary systematically
as a function of the demands placed on controlled attention
within each task, but surprisingly, this does not correspond with
mind wandering-related deficits in performance. Importantly,
this striking pattern of results is different from any of the pre-
dicted outcomes outlined in Table 1. According to the theoretical
possibilities outlined in Table 1, variations in mind wandering
rates across conditions and performance related deficits owing
to mind wandering ought to co-occur. Our pattern of find-
ings suggests that a different conceptual framework is needed to
understand the interplay between mind wandering, reading and
attention; a conceptual framework that we develop in the General
Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of this experiment was to examine whether mind-
wandering rates vary as a function of item familiarity and/or
lexical status (word or non-word) in a simple item-by-item read-
ing aloud task. It is well known that more familiar words (high
frequency ones) are read aloud faster than less familiar words
(low frequency ones) and that words are typically read faster
than non-words (e.g., Forster and Chambers, 1973; Frederiksen
and Kroll, 1976). We therefore had participants read high and
low frequency words and non-words in separate blocks of trials
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while also assessing mind wandering via pseudo-randomly pre-
sented thought probes. Given the view that reading non-words
aloud is more attentionally demanding than reading words
aloud (e.g., Reynolds and Besner, 2006; O’Malley et al., 2008;
O’Malley and Besner, 2012; Waechter et al., 2012), we expected
that reading non-words aloud should yield less mind wander-
ing than do words under an executive resources view of mind
wandering. Importantly, we also examined whether there are
any measurable differences in reading aloud performance while
mind wandering relative to when subjects report being focused
on-task.
METHOD
Participants
This experiment was conducted on two independent samples of
participants (run in two separate academic terms) in order to
test the stability of any observed differences in mind wandering
across conditions, and also to increase our power to detect any
performance costs associated with mind wandering. All partici-
pants were undergraduates from the University of Waterloo, who
participated in exchange for course credit. Only participants who
reported English as their primary written and oral language were
recruited. Sample 1 consisted of 36 participants (12 males, 24
females) with a mean age of 19.5 years. Sample 2 also consisted
of 36 participants (9 males, 27 females) with a mean age of 20.0
years.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented using a MacBook Pro computer with
a 2.26GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor connected to an LG
Flatron 21.5 inch LCDmonitor. Participants’ vocal responses were
detected using the computer’s built-in microphone; key press
responses were collected from a separate keyboard connected
to the computer. The experiment was programmed in Python
Version 2.6.6 (www.python.org/) and run using PsychoPy soft-
ware (Peirce, 2007). Stimuli consisted of 200 words with a Kucera
and Francis (1967) (KF) mean frequency of 329.5 (SD = 534.9)
(henceforth referred to as high frequency words), 200 words with
a mean KF frequency of 6.3 (SD = 5.7) (henceforth referred to as
low frequency words), and 200 pronounceable non-words. High
and low frequency words were obtained using the Washington
University Speech and Hearing Lab Neighborhood Database
(128.252.27.56/Neighborhood/Home.asp) with the constraints
that all words be five letters in length. Non-words were gen-
erated using the ARC non-word database (Rastle et al., 2002)
with the constraints that all letter strings were five letters long,
consisted of legal bigrams, orthographically existing onsets, and
a minimum orthographic neighborhood size of 1. High fre-
quency, low frequency, and non-words had orthographic neigh-
borhood sizes of 3.57, 3.40, and 3.66 respectively (as measured
by Coltheart’s N, taken from: MCWord: An orthographic word-
form database, www.neuro.mcw.edu) and did not significantly
differ from one another, F(2, 597) = 0.52, p = 0.59. All stimuli
were presented in white Arial lowercase font on a gray back-
ground and subtended a visual angle of approximately 1.0◦ ver-
tically and 3.5◦ degrees horizontally. The items are available on
request.
PROCEDURE
Participants were told that they would view a single letter string at
a time on the computer screen, and that their task was to read each
item aloud. The three item types (high frequency, low frequency
and non-words) were presented in a blocked manner, resulting
in three blocks of 200 trials each, for a total of 600 experimen-
tal trials. Block-order was counter-balanced across participants.
Vocal onsets were detected by the computer at which point the
stimulus was replaced by a central fixation cross that subtended
1◦ of visual angle. The experimenter then coded whether the
trial was “correct,” “incorrect,” or “spoiled” by use of the key-
board, after which the fixation cross remained on the screen for
an additional 500ms. An utterance was considered to be incorrect
if an erroneous phoneme was produced, or if an orthographic or
phonological neighbor was produced instead of the target stimu-
lus. One participant from sample 1 was excluded from all analyses
on the basis of an exceptionally high percentage of errors in the
non-word condition (31%); an additional participant was tested
to complete the counterbalance. A trial was considered to be
“spoiled” if something other than the participant’s voice triggered
the microphone, or if the microphone failed to be triggered by
the participant’s voice, which accounted for an average of 1.8% of
trials (there was no relation between the frequency of spoiled tri-
als and the frequency of mind wandering among the individuals
tested).
In addition to the primary reading task, participants were
informed that at various points throughout the experiment their
thoughts would be probed. These thought probes were signaled
by a pure tone (350ms in duration), at which point participants
were asked to indicate whether, to the best of their knowledge,
their attention was focused on or off the reading task. Prior
to the experiment, participants were provided with the follow-
ing definition of on-task vs. off-task thought (mind wandering),
taken from Smallwood et al. (2007): “During this experiment you
will be asked at various points whether your attention is firmly
directed toward the task, or alternatively you may be aware of
other things than just the task. Occasionally you may find as
you are reading that you begin thinking about something com-
pletely unrelated to what you are reading; this is what we refer
to as mind wandering.” Participants were also provided with
written definitions of on- and off-task thought that they were
free to consult throughout the experiment. These written defi-
nitions were stated as follows: “On-task: Just prior to the tone,
your attention was firmly directed toward the task. Off-task:
Just prior to the tone, you were aware of things other than the
task; you were thinking of something completely unrelated to
what you were reading.” Participants indicated that they were
on-task by pressing the “z” key on the keyboard and indicated
that they were off-task by pressing the “m” key (this assign-
ment was reversed for half of the participants). For each block
of trials (high frequency, low frequency and non-words) there
were ten thought probes. Thought probes were presented pseudo-
randomly throughout each block with the constraints that no
probes were encountered within the first 15 trials of each block
and that probes were separated by a minimum of 12 intervening
reading trials. The experiment took approximately 25minutes to
complete.
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RESULTS
Mind wandering rates
The mean frequency of off-task reports collapsed across item
type and sample was 37.1%. Frequencies of off-task reports for
each participant were submitted to an ANOVA that treated item
type (high frequency, low frequency, non-word) as a within sub-
ject factor, and sample (1, 2) as a between subjects factor. There
was a significant effect of item type, F(2, 140) = 5.20, p = 0.007,
η2p = 0.07, but no main effect of sample, nor was there a sample
x item type interaction, (F’s < 1). Follow-up paired compar-
isons (collapsed across sample) revealed that mind wandering
rates were higher for high frequency words (41.5%) than non-
words (31.1%), t(71) = 3.05, p = 0.003, d = 0.36, and higher for
low frequency words (38.8%) than non-words, t(71) = 2.34, p =
0.022, d = 0.28. Mind wandering rates did not significantly differ
between high and low frequency words, t < 1. Mean mind wan-
dering rates as a function of item type and sample are depicted in
Figure 1A.
Response times and percentage errors
Correct response times (RTs) for the reading task were first
submitted to a non-recursive outlier procedure that eliminates
observations using a standard deviation cut-off based on cell size
(Van Selst and Jolicoeur, 1994). This procedure resulted in the
exclusion of an average of 3.2% of the observations within each
cell. Paired comparisons revealed that more RTs were excluded
in the low frequency condition (3.21%) relative to the non-
word condition (3.06%), t(71) = 3.06, p = 0.003, d = 0.36, there
were no other significant differences in the percentage of outliers
excluded. The remaining correct mean RTs for each participant
in each condition were then submitted to an ANOVA that treated
item type (high frequency, low frequency, non-word) as a within
subject factor and sample (1, 2) as a between subjects factor. This
analysis revealed a main effect of item type, F(2, 140) = 88.60, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.56, but no main effect of sample, nor was there a
sample x item type interaction, (F’s< 1). Follow-up comparisons
(collapsed across sample) revealed mean RTs to be significantly
faster in the high frequency condition (589ms) than in either
the low frequency condition (646ms), t(71) = 8.53, p < 0.001,
d = 1.01, or the non-word condition (793ms), t(71) = 10.57, p <
0.001, d = 1.25. RTs in the low frequency condition were sig-
nificantly faster than in the non-word condition, t(71) = 8.10,
p < 0.001, d = 0.95; a replication of the well-known effect of
item frequency and lexical status on reading times first reported
by Forster and Chambers (1973).
We also conducted an item analysis by submitting mean RTs
collapsed across subjects to a one-way ANOVA with item type as
a between condition factor. This revealed a significant effect of
item type, F(2, 597) = 726.53, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.71. Mean RTs as
a function of item type and sample are depicted in Figure 1B.
The percentages of errors committed as a function of item type
for each participant were also submitted to an ANOVA with item
type (high frequency, low frequency, non-word) as a within sub-
ject factor and sample (1, 2) as a between subject factor. There
was a significant effect of item type, F(2, 140) = 19.04, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.21. There was no main effect of sample nor was there a
sample x item type interaction, F’s < 1. Follow up comparisons
(collapsed across sample) revealed significantly fewer errors in
the high frequency condition (0.9%) than in the low frequency
condition (1.7%), t(71) = 4.79, p < 0.001, d = 0.56, or non-word
condition (2.4%), t(71) = 5.30, p < 0.001, d = 0.62. In addition,
fewer errors were committed in the low frequency condition rela-
tive to the non-word condition, t(71) = 2.69, p = 0.009, d = 0.32.
Mean error percentages as a function of item type and sample are
depicted in Figure 1C.
Performance by probe response
In order to assess whether off-task reports were accompanied
by any consequences on reading performance, mean correct RTs
were computed from the five trials prior to each thought probe
as a function of whether the proceeding thought probe received
an “on-task” or “off-task” response 1. Prior work from our lab
has shown that the five trials prior to a thought probe provide
reliable measures of performance differences as a function of
probe response in other tasks such as synchronously respond-
ing to a metronome (Seli et al., 2013). On-task and off-task RTs
as a function of item type (high frequency, low frequency, non-
word) were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA. Since
mean RTs were compared within participant, only participants
with at least 1 “on-task” and at least 1 “off-task” response for each
item type were included in the analysis. This analysis revealed
a main effect of item type, F(2, 108) = 33.27, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.38; analogous to the effects of item frequency and lexical sta-
tus seen in the overall pattern of RTs. There was however no main
effect of probe response, with RTs being similar on the five tri-
als prior to both on-task (693ms) and off-task (685ms) reports.
Importantly, there was no item type x probe response interaction
(F < 1), indicating that task difficulty did not modulate or dictate
performance differences on the trials preceding on and off-task
reports.
We also assessed corresponding error percentages on the five
trials prior to the thought probes and submitted them to a 3 (item
type) × 2 (probe response) ANOVA. This analysis yielded no sig-
nificant effects involving probe response (F’s < 1), in-line with
the pattern of RTs observed.
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of Experiment 1 was twofold: (1) to
assess the prevalence of mind wandering in a standard item by
item reading aloud paradigm as a function of the demands of
the reading task (lexical vs. sublexical processing), and (2) to
assess whether mind wandering affected performance on the pri-
mary task. In line with the predictions of attentional resource
views of mind wandering (i.e., Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
Smallwood, 2010), the condition with the slowest RT and high-
est error rate (the non-word condition) was also the condition
in which the lowest frequency of mind wandering was observed.
This variation in mind wandering across conditions suggests
that reading aloud is affected by attention (likely the same type
1Although we report only the analyses from the five trials prior to the thought
probes, we conducted identical analyses using only one, two, three, or four
trials prior to the thought probes. The exact same pattern of data was obtained
from these analyses as in the five-trials back analysis reported here.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Mean percentages of “off-task” responses to the thought probes as a function of item type and sample. (B) Mean vocal onset latencies for
reading aloud as a function of item type and sample, and (C) corresponding error percentages. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
of attention that is involved in mind wandering). Importantly
however, there were no effects of mind wandering on reading per-
formance itself. That is, mind wandering did not affect either RT
or errors when reading aloud.
The results of Experiment 1 are surprising. It was expected that
if mind wandering rates varied by condition (lexical vs. sublexical
processing) then mind wandering-related deficits in performance
should also have occurred, since the former result suggests that
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mind wandering and reading aloud require the same type of
attention. The failure to see any performance costs when read-
ing aloud suggests that the predictions outlined in Table 1 are too
simplistic. It seems necessary to posit some way in which primary
task demands can affect the frequency of reported mind wander-
ing, yet mind wandering itself does not affect performance on
the primary task. Specifically, we suggest that participants may
modulate the degree of mind wandering they engage in, in-line
with the primary task demands, so that the executive/attentional
resources devoted to mind wandering do not impinge on those
required for primary task performance. We return to this point
in the General Discussion. Before speculating on such processes
however, we sought to determine whether the pattern of results
observed in Experiment 1 would alsomanifest in yet another well-
studied item-by-item laboratory paradigm involving overt vocal
responding, namely, the Stroop task.
EXPERIMENT 2
The primary purpose of Experiment 2 is to examine the potential
influence of mind wandering on perhaps the most robust, well-
studied behavioral effect in cognitive psychology; Stroop [1935;
see MacLeod (1991) for a review]. Given that variations in mind
wandering across conditions in Experiment 1 did not co-occur
with mind wandering-related performance deficits (as was pre-
dicted) we seek to provide a replication of this surprising finding
in Experiment 2. In a standard Stroop task, the reader names the
print color of a color word that either matches or mismatches the
print color of that word. This Stroop effect can be measured by
the difference in RT to incongruent items (i.e., the word “red” in
green) and congruent items (i.e., the word “red” in red). Stroop-
type tasks have been relied upon by researchers to measure and
explore the processes related to reading (Brown et al., 2002),
attention (Besner and Stolz, 1999; Roberts and Besner, 2005), as
well as learning and automaticity (Crump et al., 2006; Milliken
et al., 2012), to name a few.
The Stroop task lends itself well to the present study, since
the executive resources required to accurately name the color of
congruent and incongruent trials differ markedly, with incongru-
ent trials placing greater demands on attention and controlled
processing, by, for example, necessitating both goal maintenance
and competition resolution from competing stimulus dimen-
sions (Kane and Engle, 2003); executive processes not required
for performance on congruent trials. We therefore expected mind
wandering rates to be significantly higher during a block of incon-
gruent Stroop trials relative to a block of congruent trials. If so,
the question then is whether the dependence of task demands
onmind wandering rates co-occurs with mind wandering-related
performance deficits or if the pattern of results observed with
reading aloud in Experiment 1 can be extended to naming aloud
as well.
METHOD
Participants
Forty undergraduates (9 males, 31 females) with a mean age
of 20.3 years from the University of Waterloo participated in
exchange for course credit. All participants reported normal color
vision and English as their primary written and oral language.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were presented using an iMac computer with a 2.26GHz
Intel Core 2 Duo processor and a 21.5 inch LCD monitor.
Participants’ vocal responses were detected using the computer’s
built-in microphone; key press responses were collected from a
separate keyboard connected to the computer. All stimuli were
presented in Arial lowercase font on a black background and sub-
tended a visual angle of approximately 1.0◦ vertically and 3.5◦
horizontally. The items the words “red,” “green,” “blue,” and “yel-
low,” and were presented in the colors red, green, blue, and yellow.
Congruent trials were created by presenting words in their match-
ing ink colors (i.e., the word “red” in red) and incongruent trials
were created by presenting words in a mismatching ink color (i.e.,
the word “green” in blue, red, or yellow).
Procedure
Participants were told that they would view a single color word at
a time on the computer screen, and that their task was to name
aloud the color that the word was presented in and to ignore
the word itself. The two item types (congruent and incongruent)
were blocked, with block-order counter-balanced across partic-
ipants. Note that we chose not to include neutral trials in the
present experiment, this was done because, (1) any differences in
attentional demands between congruent and neutral trials is likely
minimal, and (2) we did not want to reduce the block size for con-
gruent and incongruent trial types so as to have sufficient power
to observe mind wandering differences across conditions as well
as any potential performance costs associated with on and off-
task reports. The experiment was run in blocks of 150 trials (two
congruent blocks and two incongruent blocks, interleaved). Vocal
onsets were detected by the computer at which point the stimu-
lus was replaced by a central fixation cross that subtended 1◦ of
visual angle. The experimenter then coded whether the trial was
“correct,” “incorrect,” or “spoiled” by use of the keyboard, after
which the fixation cross remained on the screen for an additional
500ms. An utterance was considered to be incorrect if a color
name other than the color of the target stimulus was uttered, or if
the participant began uttering an incorrect color name and then
self-corrected (i.e., “bl—yellow”). A trial was considered to be
“spoiled” if something other than the participant’s voice triggered
the microphone, or if the microphone failed to be triggered by
the participant’s voice, which accounted for an average of 2.0% of
trials (there was no relation between the frequency of spoiled tri-
als and the frequency of mind wandering among the individuals
tested).
In addition to the primary Stroop task, participants were
pseudo-randomly asked to indicate whether their thoughts were
most recently focused on or off the task in the same manner as
in Experiment 1. Six thought probes were presented within each
block, for a total of 12 thought probes for each item type (congru-
ent vs. incongruent). The experiment took approximately 30min
to complete.
RESULTS
Mind wandering rates
The mean frequency of off-task reports collapsed across trial type
was 36%. Frequencies of off-task reports for each participant
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were submitted to a paired samples t-test that compared the fre-
quency of off-task reports between congruent and incongruent
blocks. There was a significant effect of trial type on off-task
reports, t(39) = 2.14, p = 0.039, d = 0.34, with a lower frequency
of off-task reports occurring for incongruent trials (31%) than for
congruent trials (41%). Meanmind wandering rates as a function
of trial type are depicted in Figure 2A.
Response times and percentage errors
Correct RTs as a function of trial type were submitted to the
same outlier elimination procedure as in Experiment 1. This
resulted in the exclusion of 2.6% of RTs from further analysis.
There was no difference in the percentage of outliers removed
between the congruent and incongruent conditions. Mean RTs
for each participant were then submitted to a paired-samples
t-test, that revealed congruent RTs (599ms) to be significantly
faster than incongruent RTs (765ms), t(39) = 15.96, p < 0.001,
d = 2.52; the well-known Stroop effect. In addition, mean per-
centage errors were also lower for congruent trials (0.2%) relative
to incongruent trials (2.5%), t(39) = 3.21, p = 0.003, d = 0.51,
ruling out a speed-accuracy trade-off interpretation of the pat-
tern of RTs. Mean RTs and corresponding error rates are depicted
in Figure 2B.
Performance by probe response
As in Experiment 1, mean correct RTs for the five trials prior
to each thought probe were submitted to a repeated measures
FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean percentages of “off-task” responses to the thought
probes as a function of trial type. (B) Mean vocal onset latencies as a
function of trial type and sample (and corresponding error percentages).
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
ANOVA that included trial type (congruent, incongruent) and
probe response (“on-task”/“off-task”) as factors 2. There was
a main effect of trial type, F(1, 25) = 72.63, p < 0.001, η2p =
0.74, with RTs being faster on congruent (577ms) relative to
incongruent (760ms) trials; a replication of the pattern of RTs
seen in the overall analysis of the Stroop effect. In contrast,
there was no main effect of probe response, with similar RTs
prior to on-task (686ms) relative to off-task (699ms) probe
responses. In addition, there was no trial type x probe response
interaction.
We also computed corresponding percentage errors on the
five trials prior to the thought probes and submitted them to a
repeated measures ANOVA that included trial type and probe
response as factors. This analysis revealed a significant main effect
of probe response on errors, F(1, 25) = 4.47, p = 0.045, η2p =
0.15, with errors tending to be higher prior to “off-task” relative
to “on-task” responses (1.6 and 0.5% respectively). There was no
trial type x probe response interaction.
DISCUSSION
Similar to the results of Experiment 1 and consistent with
attentional resource accounts of mind wandering, the results of
Experiment 2 again showed that the condition with the slowest
RT and highest error rate (the incongruent condition) was the
condition with the lowest frequency of reported mind wandering.
This again suggests that the attentional processes related to read-
ing (or the prevention of reading in the incongruent condition)
overlap with the attentional processes related to mind wander-
ing. Crucially though, we again found very poor correspondence
between variations in mind wandering across conditions and
performance deficits related to mind wandering (no difference
in the pattern of RTs and a small difference in the pattern of
errors), counter to the empirical predictions outlined in the
introduction and in Table 1. The implications of these results,
together with those of Experiment 1 are taken up in the General
Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of the present study was to assess the preva-
lence of mind wandering in a reading aloud task and a Stroop task
and to determine whether (a) the incidence of mind wandering
varies as a function of the conditions in these experiments and
(b) if so, whether there are any consequences of mind wander-
ing on performance. As evidenced in Table 1, we reasoned that
if reading and mind wandering both require attention (as prior
work has indicated) and if they rely on the same type of atten-
tion, then variations in mind wandering as a function of task
demands should co-occur with mind wandering-related perfor-
mance deficits. The results were clear: the frequency of off-task
reports was quite high across both experiments (almost 40% on
average) and varied across conditions with mind wandering rates
2As in Experiment 1, although we report only the analyses from the five tri-
als prior to the thought probes, we conducted identical analyses using only
one, two, three, or four trials prior to the thought probes. The exact same pat-
tern of RTs was obtained from these analyses as in the five-trials back analysis
reported here.
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decreasing as RT and error rates increased. Importantly though,
despite the clear effects of task demands onmind wandering rates
(suggesting that mind wandering relies on the same resources as
the tasks studied here), no consistent effects of mind wander-
ing on primary task performance were observed. In other words,
the effects of the primary task on mind wandering do not pre-
dict the effects of mind wandering on the primary task, a finding
that has important ramifications for theoretical accounts of mind
wandering.
The lack of performance costs associated with mind wan-
dering in the present experiments is particularly striking given
the number of studies that have demonstrated deficits in per-
formance during mind wandering episodes in other tasks and
contexts (Smallwood et al., 2004, 2008a,b; Reichle et al., 2010;
Franklin et al., 2011; Seli et al., 2013). These deficits are argued to
occur because executive resources are directed away from external
task-related goals and information toward internal task-unrelated
goals and thoughts (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). This “per-
ceptual decoupling” is argued to result in reduced processing
of external sensory information (Smallwood et al., 2007, 2008a;
Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2011) that results in changes in
overt behavior (i.e., such as fixation durations and blink rates)
as well as deficits in objective task performance. Importantly, the
present experiments are the first to assess potential influences of
mind wandering on both reading words and non-words aloud
and color naming in the face of competing words. The scarcity of
performance costs associated with mind wandering seen here is
surprising, given the theoretical predictions outlined in the intro-
duction and seen in Table 1. At least two possible interpretations
of these surprising findings are suggested, which are outlined
below.
The lack of correspondence between variations in mind wan-
dering and performance costs owing to mind wandering in the
present study may mean that mind wandering relies upon atten-
tional resources that are wholly distinct from the attentional
resources associated with phonological re-coding and color nam-
ing. This strikes us as an unlikely proposition given the fact
that probe-caught mind wandering rates, both in the present
experiments as well as in prior work (Smallwood et al., 2007;
Forster and Lavie, 2009), vary systematically with the objective
demands of the primary task. In other words, if mind wan-
dering and task performance result from qualitatively different
executive/attentional resources, then increased recruitment of one
type of resource should not co-occur with a decreased recruit-
ment of the other. Specifically, to-date, resource competition has
been argued to be a central aspect of the relationship between
mind wandering and primary task performance (Smallwood,
2010).
A different account of the results reported here is that mind
wandering and overt reading aloud and color naming do rely
on the same attentional resources. In other words, returning to
Table 1, the first theoretical alternative may be the most accu-
rate. In order for this to be the case, and yet for variations in
mind wandering rates and performance deficits to not co-occur
(as the Table would predict), a novel conceptualization of the
relationship between mind wandering, attention, and task perfor-
mance is required. In short, (1) the lack of anymeasurable costs to
performance as a function of mind wandering seen here suggests
that reading aloud (or the prevention of reading in the Stroop
task) requires attention, but that not all attentional resources are
required in order to achieve a high level of performance. (2)
We speculate that for some tasks, there is a “saturation” point
beyond which additional resource investment proves ineffective
at improving performance. (3) “Unused” attentional resources
are then devoted to mind wandering (thus accounting for the
robust variation in mind wandering rates across conditions in
the work reported here). (4) Individuals are able to “modulate”
the amount of off-task thought they engage in so as to devote
the maximum amount of “unused” resources toward the pur-
suit of internal thoughts and goals, without impinging on the
resources needed for the primary task (and thus not interfering
with task performance). An illustration of this theoretical process
is shown in Figure 3. Finally, (5) the ease with which an individ-
ual can appropriately distribute executive resources may depend
on the extent to which one can “monitor” primary task perfor-
mance in an online manner3; tasks that afford little feedback will
be particularly ill-suited for this process and so mind wander-
ing is likely to consume resources needed for the primary task,
thus resulting in mind wandering-related performance deficits in
such tasks.
Applying the above logic to prior work, perhaps the reason
performance costs are associated with mind wandering in other
attention and reading tasks (i.e., SART, reading comprehension)
is because the resource distribution process fails due to insuffi-
cient feedback (or performancemonitoring). In the SART task for
example, the relatively low target probabilities afford little oppor-
tunity for individuals to adjust off-task thoughts compared with
the present work, in which performance can be assessed on every
trial. Likewise, when reading a passage of text, only when one has
failed to comprehend the main point of the passage, does one
realize that off-task thought was too frequent and that important
premises were missed, at which point it is too late to re-distribute
resources accordingly. This “distribution” account of mind wan-
dering would therefore predict that as feedback on task perfor-
mance increases, costs associated with mind wandering decrease.
While speculative at present, the idea that internal/external
resource distribution trade-offs depend on one’s ability to moni-
tor online performance suggests an interesting avenue for future
study. This theoretical proposal also predicts that in particularly
difficult tasks, in which all executive resources are needed for good
performance, any mind wandering observed will interfere with
performance on the primary task; an issue to be pursued in future
studies.
Finally, the present findings may suggest a potentially useful
way in which researchers can make use of mind wandering rates
in future research. Specifically, because mind wandering rates
proved to be reliable predictors of RT and error rates in both of
the experiments reported here, yet probe response (on or off-task)
did not interact with the primary behavioral measure of interest
3We remain deliberately agnostic as to whether this type of adjustment in the
distribution of executive resources occurs implicitly or explicitly and suggest
that it needs to be addressed in future work.
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FIGURE 3 | A theoretical depiction of the distribution of
executive/attentional resources in theword reading and non-word
reading conditionsof Experiment 1. The ideal distribution point is shown;
the point at which mind wandering is maximized without impinging on
resources needed for reading. A distribution point to the left of the one
shown would result in primary task performance costs, whereas a
distribution point to the right of the one shownwould result in a decrease in
mind wandering with no appreciable benefits to primary task performance.
(word frequency effect, Stroop effect) the frequency of mind wan-
dering rates across tasks and across conditions within tasks may
serve as an independent diagnostic test of the relative demands
placed on executive/attentional resources in various domains and
contexts. This should be a source of comfort to researchers who
make use of such effects to infer and study fundamental pro-
cesses related to human cognition, since recent work on mind
wandering would suggest that there may be significant effects
of off-task rumination on performance in such tasks. Therefore
mind wandering should not be thought of simply as an unavoid-
able hindrance, or even confound, in experimental psychology,
but as a useful tool to be exploited in future work.
In summary, the present experiments represent the first empir-
ical exploration of mind wandering in the context of reading
aloud and color naming. It was found that mind wandering
rates were quite high and negatively predicted RTs and errors
across both of the experiments reported here. While this finding
is in line with attentional resource accounts of mind wander-
ing, the obvious lack of correspondence between performance
deficits associated with mind wandering and variations in mind
wandering across conditions in both tasks necessitates a recon-
sideration of the relationship between resource competition
(between on and off-task thought) and primary task perfor-
mance. Specifically, we argue that, at least in the kinds of tasks
studied here, there is a point beyond which additional attentional
resource investment affords little or no appreciable benefit to per-
formance, and that consequently, individuals are able to make
online adjustments to the distribution of attentional/executive
resources that facilitates the pursuit of both internal and external
goals.
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